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Abstract: Allaz and Vila (1993) show that oligopolists have a strategic motive to sell 
forward. In their model the possibility of forward trading increases competitiveness 
between firms, raising consumer surplus and welfare. In this study we examine this 
prediction in a controlled laboratory environment. We investigate how and to what 
extent the market institution and the number of firms affect competition, in theory and 
in our experimental markets. Our findings support the main comparative-static 
predictions of the model but also suggest that the competition-enhancing effect of a 
forward market is weaker than predicted. In contrast, entry has a stronger 
competition-enhancing effect.  
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1 Introduction 
Forward contracting has a long history in commodity markets but has also become 
increasingly important elsewhere, particularly in financial asset trading and in the 
energy sector. For market design it is of interest whether forward markets have 
desirable effects on welfare and efficiency. An example is the recent debate on the 
design flaws in the Californian electricity market. The Market Surveillance 
Committee, a group of independent advisers to the governing board of the Californian 
Independent System Operator, recommended to remove any restrictions on forward 
contracting, suggesting that this would not only prevent seasonal price peaks but also 
“significantly limit the ability of generators to exercise market power”.
1  
The idea that forward markets might enhance competition has also been discussed in 
the theoretical literature. Allaz and Vila (1993) (henceforth AV) suggest a further, 
strategic, reason for the existence of forward markets beyond the usual hedging 
motive. They show that a single firm may obtain a leadership position by selling 
forward; motivated by this opportunity, all producers offer forward contracts and as a 
consequence compete more aggressively overall, resulting in more output at lower 
prices and thereby increasing consumer surplus and total welfare.
2 Relative to an 
increase in competitive pressure due to entry, the competition-enhancing effect of 
forward trading is surprisingly strong in AV’s framework: introducing a forward 
market is predicted to have the same effect as squaring the number of competing 
firms. There is some controversy about AV’s result. In particular, Harvey and Hogan 
(2000) and Kamat and Oren (2004) doubt that the competition-enhancing effect holds 
if firms play the game repeatedly, as is undeniably the case in most real markets. They 
argue that a dynamic setting may enable firms to commit to keeping their forward 
positions to a minimum. 
In this paper, we report the results of a laboratory experiment, designed to 
assess the behavioral relevance of AV’s predictions in a repeated market. Testing 
whether and to what extent forward markets improve efficiency in the field requires 
strategic data, which is extremely difficult to obtain from real firms. Laboratory 
methods, on the other hand, allow to set and manipulate critical parameters such as 
                                                 
1 Wolak, Nordhaus and Shapiro (2000), p.15. 
2 Others have arrived at similar conclusions, see for example von der Fehr and Harbord (1992), Bolle 
(1993) and Powell (1993); see also the paper by Allaz (1992). The intuition for this intriguing result is 
that a forward market has some commitment value. Other commitment devices can create very similar 
effects in oligopolies, for example strategic delegation (see Huck, Müller and Normann, 2004).   4
the number of competitors, cost functions and demand behavior. Our data comprises 
observations on forty-six laboratory-controlled experimental markets. Two 
benchmark conditions were employed where sellers engaged in standard Cournot 
competition, with either two or four sellers per market. In the AV treatments, the 
duopolists or quadropolists could first offer units on a forward market before entering 
the spot market stage. Making transactions on the forward market committed sellers to 
the production of their contracted quantities but they were free to produce additional 
units for the residual demand on the spot market. 
We find that forward markets enhance competition and efficiency in our 
experiment. Production levels and consumer surplus are systematically higher in the 
AV treatments than under Cournot, and prices are significantly lower. However, in 
contrast to the prediction, we also find that changing the number of competitors in the 
Cournot markets from two to four is far more effective than introducing the forward 
trading institution. 
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to examine AV’s predictions in the 
laboratory. Previous experimental work has investigated other aspects of forward 
markets. Sunder (1995) reviews experiments studying the informational efficiency of 
forward markets. Reynolds’s (2000) experiment examines the famous Coase (1972) 
conjecture which has some resemblance with AV’s finding. However, there are also 
important differences, most notably perhaps that in AV’s setup a monopolist would 
not be affected by the introduction of a forward market. Consequently, we focus on 
competing firms and their strategic interactions, the key elements driving AV’s result. 
Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier (2001) report an experiment where sellers and 
buyers have access to a forward market and/or a spot market under a double auction 
trading mechanism. They find that consumer surplus and market efficiency are 
highest when trading is only allowed on the forward market and lowest when trading 
is only allowed on the spot market. However, in their design inventory costs provide 
sellers with an additional incentive to operate on the forward market. Therefore the 
strategic effect of forward trading is not clear (nor is this the focus of their study). 
Since we conducted our experiment a related laboratory study by Brandts, 
Pezanis-Christou and Schram (2003) has emerged that nicely complements our paper. 
Their design is also inspired by AV’s model, but incorporates competition in supply 
functions, a quadratic marginal production cost schedule and an oligopolistic trader 
market linking forward and spot stage. Our design, in contrast, abstracts from costs,   5
focuses exclusively on quantity competition and uses a simulated, competitive, trader 
market under the control of the experimenter. With their enriched environment 
Brandts et al. aspire to mimic some important aspects of real electricity markets, while 
we are more interested in the principle workings of the forward market institution. For 
this purpose, the simplicity of our design comprises the advantage that the predictions 
are very clear and sharply separated out for the different treatments. Interestingly 
though, the results in Brandts et al. confirm ours. They too observe a competition-
enhancing effect as a result of forward contracting, and they also find that a change in 
market size has a greater effect on competition. We take this as evidence that our 
findings extend to richer settings. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we study 
AV’s model for the case of n firms. The experimental design is described in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The model 
Consider first the standard symmetric Cournot model with linear demand and cost and 
n firms. Equilibrium aggregate production and market price are given by 
() ( ) 1
* + − = n n c A X , [1] 
() ( ) 1
* + + = n nc A p , [2] 
respectively, where A is a parameter of the demand function (p = A – X) and c is the 
marginal cost. 
Next, consider n firms competing in AV’s two-stage setting. Since information 
is complete, there is no risk-hedging rationale for forward trading. As we shall see, 
however, there is a strategic incentive. In the first stage sellers simultaneously choose 
their forward positions  i f , yielding an aggregate forward quantity  ∑ = i f F . A 
forward price,  F p , then emerges as a result of the market process. In the second stage 
(the spot market) firms compete only for the residual demand the commitment 
implied by the forward contracts makes the first stage results strategically irrelevant. 
The residual demand function is  S F A pS − − =  (where S is the aggregate spot 
quantity). This leads to a equilibrium spot market price of 
  () ( ) 1
* + − + = n F nc A pS . [3] 
A comparison between Equations [2] and [3] shows that the presence of a 
forward market lowers the spot market price, i.e. F > 0 implies 
* * p pS < . To see that   6
firms have an individual strategic incentive to make forward transactions, note first 
that because the spot market price is anticipated by all market participants the forward 
market equilibrium must yield a contract price equal to the spot price (
*
S F p p = ). 

























f i i i π . [4] 
The first term in brackets denotes the profit margin,  c pS −
* . The second term is 
firm i’s total production level, i.e. its forward position,  i f , and its anticipated spot 
quantity. Forward contracts signed by firm i thus lower the market price as well as 
firm i’s expected spot sales. However, these negative effects are mainly external: firm 
i’s competitors share these costs. Moreover, by signing forward firm i benefits 
individually from an immediate increase in sales. This positive effect dominates and if 
firm i’s competitors refrained from forward contracting, i.e. if  i j f j ≠ ∀ = 0 , it would 
become a Stackelberg leader. However, this is not an equilibrium. Solving for the 
symmetric equilibrium forward position yields 










* . [5] 
From this the equilibrium levels for all variables can be derived immediately. 
Table 1 summarizes and compares the results with the Cournot case. A number of 
comparative-static predictions can be derived from Table 1. 
1. An increase in the number of firms implies lower prices and higher output 
under both market institutions. 
2. For a given number of competitors, introducing a forward market enhances 
competition (higher quantities, lower prices). 
3. In terms of production, prices, total profits and consumer surplus adding a 
forward stage has the same effect as squaring the number of competitors. 
Thus, the predicted competition-enhancing effect of forward trading is very 
strong. It is driven by a prisoner’s dilemma-type problem among the firms. If all 
players refrain from forward trading they achieve moderately high payoffs. However, 
a single firm could then gain a profitable leadership position at the expense of its 
competitors. In equilibrium, all firms make forward transactions at relatively low 
profit levels.   7
Table 1: Theoretical results 
  Cournot: 
Spot market only 
AV: 
Forward & spot market 








































































































































3 Design of the experiment 
3.1 Treatments and predictions 
We compare two market institutions, one with standard Cournot competition (C 
markets) and one in which firms first have access to a forward market and then to a 
spot market (AV markets). As a second treatment variable we vary the number of 
firms (two versus four). Thus, we have four session types in a 2x2 design. Simulated 
buyers determine the market price in all conditions. 
To simplify the decision problem for the subjects we abstracted from production 
costs. This leaves the key characteristics of the theoretical predictions unaltered. 
Participants chose quantities from the set of whole numbers between 0 and 1000. In 
the Cournot sessions the price was computed as 
{} 0 , 1000 max t t X p − =  [6] 
where t X denotes the total quantity in period t. 
In the forward stage of the AV sessions we provided the artificial consumers 
with the expectation of Cournot play in the spot stage, exactly as in AV’s model. 

















t  [7] 
where  t F  is the total forward quantity chosen in period t.
3 Thus, our experiment does 
not test whether real buyers are as sophisticated in predicting spot market outcomes as 
AV assume in their model. However, AV use this aspect merely as an auxiliary device 
to demonstrate that the forward market effect is strategic in character and not due to 
hedging. In our experiment we are interested in the behavior of firms and thus try to 
abstract from imperfections in the trading institution. Buyer behavior can and should 
be explored, but this should be done separately and we leave this for future research.
4 
The spot market price in the AV sessions was determined by Equation [6]. 
Payoffs were computed as the sum of revenues from the forward and the spot market. 
Table 2 lists the predictions derived from the model for all treatments. 
 
Table 2: Equilibrium predictions for all treatments 
  C2 C4  AV2  AV4 
Total forward quantity        400 706 
Total spot quantity        400 235 
Total production  666 800 800 941 
Price (e$)  3.33 2.00 2.00 0.59 
Profit per firm (e$)  1111.11 400.00 800.00 138.80 
Consumer surplus (e$)  2222.22 3200.00 3200.00 4429.07 
 
3.2 Experimental procedures 
The computerized experiments were conducted at the Centre for Decision Research 
and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) at the University of Nottingham. In total 124 
subjects participated in eight sessions (two in each treatment) and no subject took part 
in more than one session. We collected data on 15 independent markets in each of the 
two-seller treatments (C2 and AV2) and on 8 independent markets in each of the four-
seller treatments (C4 and AV4). In all sessions subjects interacted for thirty periods. 
Subjects were paid according to their profits (plus a £2 flat fee). We used an 
artificial laboratory currency denominated in “experimental dollars” (e$, 1e$ = 100 
                                                 
3 We refer to a “period” as the complete cycle consisting of the forward stage and the spot stage. 
4 In Brandts et al. two human traders compete on the forward market. However, these traders are not 
always competitive and typically manage to keep forward market prices artificially low. While this is 
an interesting result in its own right, we wish to abstract from such complications in our design.   9
eCents). Because predicted earnings differed substantially across treatments and 
because it could be expected that the AV sessions would last considerably longer than 
the Cournot sessions, we adjusted the exchange rates such that expected cash earnings 
would reflect the time subjects spent in the laboratory. On average, participants 
earned £9.94 (ca. 15 US$ at the time of the experiment).
5 
Communication between subjects was not permitted and dividers separated the 
individual workplaces. To make the incentive structure of the situation more 
transparent we equipped our software with a “results calculator” which participants 
could use to experiment with hypothetical decisions prior to submitting a real choice.
6 
As outlined in the introduction, one of the main criticisms of AV’s static model 
is that it does not address the dynamic nature of many real-world markets. We 
therefore decided to employ a fixed-matching protocol which creates a repeated game 
setting and hence directly addresses the expressed concerns. Thus, the initial (random 
and anonymous) allocation of participants to separate markets was not altered in the 
course of a session. This makes our investigation into the empirical relevance of AV’s 
theory more challenging for the model but also more realistic. Of course, because 
each market has a commonly known finite horizon, the equilibrium predictions are 
unaffected by repetition. 
At the end of each decision round i.e. at the end of a period in the Cournot 
treatment and at the end of the forward or spot stage in the AV treatment a “Results 
Screen” displayed the total production in the relevant market, the market price and the 
profit. Before the participants entered the next stage or period a “History Screen” was 
shown that listed all previous outcomes in the market in a summarized form. 
 
4 Experimental results 
4.1 Overview 
Table 3 displays a summary of the data at an aggregate level, listing overall averages 
and standard deviations for each treatment. Comparing the entries in this table with 
the corresponding theoretical values in Table 2 we note that behavior in both four-
seller treatments appears to be somewhat over-competitive (higher-than-predicted 
production levels, lower-than-predicted prices) while we see a slight tendency towards 
                                                 
5 The exchange rates were 60 eCents (C2), 20 eCents (C4 and AV2) and 4 eCents (AV4) per penny. A 
copy of the instructions can be found in Appendix A. 
6 A detailed description of the way the results calculator worked is given in Appendix B.   10
under-competitive behavior in both two-seller treatments. Overall, behavior is 
remarkably stable over the thirty periods. There is no indication that the discrepancies 
between point predictions and data decrease over time.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics (averages; standard deviations in parentheses)
7 
  C2 C4 AV2  AV4 

















































To formally assess the predictions of the model we employ only non-parametric 
tests at the level of markets, throughout the results section. Because of the fixed-group 
design each market can be considered as an independent observation. 
Using a two-sided Wilcoxon one-sample signed rank test we find that total 
production in both quadropoly conditions is indeed significantly higher than predicted 
(p-value 0.042). In the two-seller treatments the discrepancies between theory and 
data are marginally significant (p-value 0.074 in C2 and 0.065 in AV2). With respect 
to prices we can reject the null hypothesis only in C2 (p-value 0.044); the deviations 
from theory are marginally significant in C4 and AV2 (p-values 0.080 and 0.094) and 
not significant in AV4 (p-value 0.441). 
Note that quantities and prices are generally not perfectly correlated. For 
example, occasional excessive levels of supply (above 1000 units) can drive up the 
                                                 
7 The standard deviations reported measure the variation of the means across markets. In the AV 
treatments we compute the market price per period as the average of the forward price and the spot 
price, weighted by the number of units sold in each stage.   11
average production level considerably; prices on the other hand can never fall below 
zero. Furthermore, in the AV treatment, the average market price depends on how the 
output is distributed between forward and spot stage.  
Consumer surplus and profits are not significantly different from theory with the 
exception of C4 where profits are 26% lower than predicted (p-value 0.030) and 
consumer surplus is 14% higher than predicted (p-value 0.059). 
Overall, the deviations from theory are not excessive. The most clear-cut 
discrepancies between predictions and data are found in the Cournot quadropolies 
where outcomes tend to be more competitive than in Nash equilibrium. There is, on 
average, a tendency towards less-than-competitive quantities/prices in the duopoly 
treatments but this does not have a great impact on welfare measures. However, the 
main characteristic of our duopoly data is the substantial heterogeneity across 
markets: some pairs of sellers succeed in establishing outcomes near the collusive 
benchmark, others display behavior close to equilibrium and a few even compete 
more aggressively than that. The heterogeneity is less pronounced in C4 and AV4; 
about half the markets are close to predictions while the other half is too competitive 
relative to theory. These results are in line with findings from previous experimental 
research on Cournot competition (see Holt, 1995, and Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 
2004, for overviews).
8 Our results suggest that the characteristic patterns of Cournot 
competition carry over to the two-stage AV markets. 
 
4.2 Comparative-static findings 
We use a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to test the comparative static predictions. Our null 
hypotheses state that changes in the number of firms or in the market institution do 
not have an impact on production, market prices or welfare. We test the null 
hypotheses against the one-sided alternatives suggested by the model. We also test for 
systematic differences between the C4 and the AV2 treatment, but use a two-sided 
alternative because theory does not predict any differences in this case. 
Table 4 lists average production, price and total welfare for all markets. We 
analyze welfare explicitly, unlike in other experimental papers on quantity 
                                                 
8 Holt (1995, p.404) summarizes: “(1) with Cournot duopolies, outcomes fall on both sides of the 
Cournot prediction, and some cases of near perfect collusion occur, and (2) with more than two sellers, 
outcomes are often more competitive than the Cournot prediction.”   12
competition, because in the two-stage AV game the relationship between quantities, 
prices and welfare is not trivial (output is not a perfect proxy for prices or welfare). 
 
Table 4: Average output, prices and welfare per market 
    Total production Market price  Total welfare 
 Market Cournot AV  Cournot AV  Cournot  AV 
Two firms  1  628.73 584.20  3.71  4.11  4286.5 4091.9 
 2  541.70 742.03  4.58  2.45  3941.9 4645.9 
 3  652.57 800.17  3.47  2.02  4310.1 4784.2 
 4  620.50 814.47  3.80  1.99  4258.2 4776.3 
 5  697.67 714.00  3.02  2.62  4455.6 4558.5 
 6  683.53 719.87  3.16  2.83  4449.4 4566.6 
 7  594.17 705.13  4.06  2.32  4143.7 4522.8 
 8  675.00 636.00  3.25  3.65  4416.3 4219.6 
 9  751.63 772.50  3.08  2.24  4272.2 4618.1 
 10  509.17 735.73  4.91  2.44  3783.2 4591.4 
 11  461.90 885.57  5.38  1.32  3527.2 4860.5 
 12  667.63 885.13  3.32  1.20  4374.1 4924.7 
 13  515.83 765.53  4.84  2.31  3817.0 4569.9 
 14  629.17 840.67  3.71  1.51  4294.9 4851.8 
 15  680.00 655.03  3.20  3.71  4463.9 4198.1 
Four firms  1  893.67 936.83  1.30  0.60  4880.0 4971.1 
 2  1155.63 1048.47 0.86 0.54 4891.1  4972.3 
 3  772.97 973.33  2.30  0.70  4694.1 4964.1 
 4  1046.57 1190.87 0.93 0.35 4884.3  4978.9 
 5  807.33 994.47  2.06  0.31  4755.5 4997.8 
 6  814.67 965.47  1.85  0.43  4808.6 4984.7 
 7  933.90 919.67  1.29  0.90  4846.7 4926.1 
 8  849.03 1030.00 1.71  0.46  4822.8  4983.7 
 
Do more firms imply higher quantities, lower prices and a welfare 
improvement? The answer is a very clear yes. When the number of sellers is changed 
from two to four, output increases by 47% in the Cournot markets and by 34% in the 
AV treatments. Prices decrease by 60% (Cournot) and 78% (AV), and total welfare 
increases by 15% and 8% respectively. These differences are highly statistically 
significant (see Table 5 for details on p-values). 
Does the forward market enhance competition? Our data again produces clear 
results in favor of the theoretical prediction. The introduction of the forward market in 
the duopoly raises quantities by 21%, lowers prices by 36% and increases welfare by 
10%. In the case of four firms the increase in production is 11%, the decrease in   13
prices is 65%, and there is a small (but systematic) increase in welfare of 3%. Again, 
all these results are statistically significant at any conventional level (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Comparative-static analysis Wilcoxon rank sum test (H0: no change) 
  Total production  Market prices  Welfare 
  versus → 
  ↓ 


































   C4≠AV2 
0.004 




Thus, we reject the null hypotheses in favor of the central theoretical 
predictions. At the same time, however, our data also shows that the introduction of 
forward trading is not as effective as doubling the number of competitors, as 
suggested by the model. In contrast to the prediction, the two-sided rank-sum test 
indicates that total production and welfare are systematically higher, and prices 
systematically lower, in C4 than in AV2. The time series in Figure 1, illustrates how 
prices in the two-seller AV and the four-seller Cournot condition differ, to some 
extent, from the theoretical prediction (as discussed in Section 4.1 above) but even 
more so from each other.
9 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
4.3 On the use of forward and spot market 
In this section we investigate how sellers in the AV treatments make use of forward 
and spot markets. Forward quantities and prices tend to be somewhat less competitive 
than the model predicts in AV2 (see Table 3; the p-value is 0.083), but are not 
significantly different from theory in AV4. 
                                                 
9 Since AV4 prices are relatively close to the predicted level, one could speculate that the four-seller 
AV results could be similar to the outcomes of a sixteen-seller Cournot treatment, as theory would 
predict. However, some experimental evidence indicates that markets with more than two firms tend to 
be more competitive than theoretically expected, and it has been suggested that “these deviations are 
increasing in the number of firms” (Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 2004)   14
Direct comparisons between the outcomes of the experimental spot markets and 
the corresponding predictions in Table 2 yield similar results. However, the spot 
market behavior should not be analyzed separately from the outcomes of the forward 
market, since the level of spot demand is determined by the choices in the preceding 
forward stage. To show how choices in the two stages are correlated we have plotted 
the spot output against the forward quantities for all markets and periods in Figure 2. 
The figure also contains the ex ante point prediction for both stages (“equilibrium 
prediction”) and the “ex post prediction” (i.e. after observing the empirical forward 
stage results) for the spot market (“spot stage Cournot path”). 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
As the figure shows, forward quantities are highly variable, which is not 
predicted by theory. On the other hand, the data points are clearly scattered around the 
spot stage Cournot paths, and the point predictions seem to satisfactorily describe 
average behavior, in particular for the four-seller markets. 
What clearly distinguishes AV2 and AV4 in Figure 2 is the occurrence of 
choices near the collusive benchmark. While these are quite frequent in the duopoly 
case, market outcomes are far away from the point of joint profit maximization in the 
four-seller case. One potential explanation for this difference is that players might try 
to use the forward market stage as a signaling device for collusion (rather than as the 
commitment device that AV’s theory suggests). Since collusion entails that firms 
choose zero quantities in the forward market stage, making this choice transports a 
clear message to one’s competitor in the duopoly treatment. In the quadropoly case, 
on the other hand, individual messages of this kind are likely to get lost, as players are 
only informed about the aggregate forward quantity. 
However, even in the two-firm case we have little evidence that players 
successfully use the forward stage as a signaling device. On the one hand we do find, 
pooling the data from all AV2 markets, that when firms choose a “small” quantity of 
up to 50 units in the forward market, about 40% of their opponents’ subsequent spot 
market choices are between 240 and 260 units. Since joint payoff maximization is 
achieved when the duopolists produce a total of 500 units, this seems to suggest that 
sending a collusive signal in the forward stage often induces a like-minded response. 
However, 87% of these “friendly responses” come from only three markets. Thus, it   15
seems rather that in some markets players simply succeed in upholding a tacit 
agreement, while in others they do not, much like in the Cournot duopolies. If a tacit 
collusive agreement is established, this is reflected in the choices in both stages. In the 
more competitive markets, in contrast, the signal from the forward market does not 
trigger the intended reaction. Hence, per se the forward market stage does not appear 
to work well as a coordination device. Overall, as we have seen, the introduction of a 
forward market stage does have a clear competition-enhancing effect, and the 
observed outcomes do not differ significantly from the “ex post” predictions in AV2. 
The four-seller AV spot markets do not display signs of collusion; on the 
contrary, they are more competitive than under Nash. Relative to “ex post” predictions 
the output is on average 13% higher (p-value 0.030). A closer analysis reveals that 
this is not because firms choose high quantities too frequently (higher-than-predicted 
quantities occur in about 50% of the time). Instead, what happens is that overshooting, 
when it occurs, is more severe than undershooting. Notice that the over-
competitiveness in the AV4 spot markets creates arbitrage opportunities, as spot 
market prices tend to be lower than forward market prices. The difference, however, 
is not at all substantial, as Figure 3 shows, and is no longer significant when we focus 
on the second half of the data (periods 16 to 30).
10 
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we report the results of a laboratory test of a two-stage forward market 
model developed by Allaz and Vila. Treatments with two and four sellers were 
conducted and compared with results from benchmark conditions in standard Cournot 
markets. Our data supports the theoretical prediction that forward markets promote 
competition. However, the predicted equivalence of introducing a forward market and 
of increasing the number of sellers from two to four is strongly rejected. Our findings 
indicate that this is due to the AV2 markets being somewhat less competitive than 
predicted by theory as well as the C4 markets being more competitive than predicted 
(the latter is the stronger of the two discrepancies). In this sense the competition-
enhancing effect of the forward market is weaker, and the effect of adding more 
                                                 
10 The discrepancy between forward and spot prices in the second half of AV2 is not significant either.   16
competitors stronger, than the theoretical comparative analysis predicts. An obvious 
candidate for explaining this effect is the notion that implicit collusive agreements are 
easier to achieve with a smaller number of players. However we do find that forward 
trading has a clear and substantial positive effect on competition, even in repeated 
duopoly markets. Thus, in the debate about the empirical relevance of AV’s results 
that was mentioned in the introduction our experiment produces evidence in support 
of the model. 
The present study should be viewed as only a first step in investigating 
experimentally how serious market designers should take forward trading institutions 
as a building block for improving efficiency in markets. Experiments may help to 
disentangle the effects of different motives for forward trading such as hedging, 
strategic trading as in AV’s model or entry deterrence as discussed in Newbery (1998) 
and Lien (2000), which may all be relevant in the field at the same time. Laboratory 
studies can also be used to evaluate the importance of particular factors that are 
relevant for the applicability of AV’s theory to real markets and have been identified 
in recent theoretical developments (see, e.g., Hughes and Kao, 1997, and Ferreira, 
2001 and 2003).    17
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Figure 1: Theoretical and empirical average prices over time 
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Figure 3: Forward and spot market prices over time 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
 
Legend: {…}  Two-seller conditions only […]  Four-seller  conditions  only 
*…* Cournot  conditions  only  #…# A&V  conditions  only 
 
Welcome! This session is part of an experiment in the economics of decision making. 
If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a 
considerable amount of money. At the end of the session you will be paid, in private 
and in cash, an amount that will depend on your decisions. 
 
General Rules  
The session will consist of 30 periods, in each of which you can earn “experimental 
dollars” (e$). At the end of the session you will be paid £2 plus an additional amount 
based on your total e$ earnings from all 30 periods. Your e$ earnings will be 
converted to cash using an exchange rate of *{60e$}[20e$]*#{20e$}[4e$]# = 1p. 
Notice that the higher your e$ earnings are, the more cash you will receive at the end 
of the session. 
There are sixteen people in this room who are participating in this session. It is 
important that you do not talk to any of the other people until the session is over. 
In this experiment each person in the room represents a firm. During the session 
[four]{eight} different markets will operate and at the beginning of the session the 
computer will randomly allocate you to one of these. Similarly, the other firms will be 
randomly allocated to markets. In your market there will be you and {one}[three] 
other firm[s]. Your e$ earnings will depend on your decisions and on the other [three] 
firm{‘s}[s’] decisions. The firm[s] you are matched with will be the same throughout 
this session but you will not learn the identity of the person[s] who represent{s} 
[these]{this} firm[s]. 
 
Description of a period 
#Each of the 30 periods consists of two successive stages. The first of these is called 




At the beginning of *each of the 30 periods* #Stage A# you have to decide how many 
units of a good to produce. You make your decision by entering a number (any whole 
number between 0 and 1000) on your terminal. After all firms have made their 
decisions, the computer will calculate your profits for *that period* #Stage A#. 
Your profits will be equal to the number of units you produce times the market price. 
The market price will depend on how many units you and the other firm[s] in your 
market have produced in total. We will call the total number of units produced in your 
market “Total Production”. The computer will calculate the market price in *a period* 
#Stage A# using the following formula.   22
 
Price = 1000 – Total Production 
 
 #{  } 
 
   [   ]# 
 
This formula gives you the market price in eCents (and 1e$ is worth 100 eCents). 
Thus, if Total Production were zero (that is, if neither you nor the other firm[s] in 
your market produced anything at all), then the market price would be *1000 eCents 
(equals 10 e$)*#{333 eCents (equals 3.33 e$)}[200 eCents (equals 2 e$)]#. But note 
that the higher Total Production is, the lower the market price will be. 
If Total Production is equal to or above 1000 units, then the market price is 0. The 
market price cannot become negative. 
At the end of *each period*#Stage A# you will see a “Results Screen”. The Results 
Screen will show how many units you have produced and how many units the other 
firm[s] in your market {has} [have] produced [in total]. It will further display the 
Total Production in your market, the market price*,* #and# the profits you have made 
in #Stage A#*that period and your accumulated profits from all periods. After the 
Results Screen, and before you enter the next period, your terminal will furthermore 




Stage B is, in principle, identical to Stage A, but with one important exception. The 
way the market price is computed in Stage B differs from the way it was computed in 
Stage A. The market price in Stage B is calculated as (this is again in eCents) 
 
Price B = 1000 – Total Production in A - Total Production in B 
 
That is, the market price in Stage B depends on both Total Production in Stage A and 
Total Production in Stage B. As before, the higher Total Production is, the lower the 
market price will be. Also as before, the market price cannot become negative: if 
Total Production in Stage B is so high that the formula for Price B would yield a 
negative result, then the computer sets Price B to zero. 
Please notice also the following additional rule. If Total Production in the first stage 
(Stage A) is already equal to or above 1000 units, then there will be no second stage 
and neither you nor the other firm[s] in your market will be able to produce in Stage 
B! If this happens your profits for that period are set to zero, and instead of entering 
Stage B, you and the other firm[s] in your market will be automatically redirected to 
the next period. 
Otherwise, your total profits in a period are computed as the sum of your profits from 
both stages. 
Price A = 1000 – Total Production in A 
3 
Price A = 1000 – Total Production in A 
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  (Price A) x (Number of units you produce in A) 
+ (Price B) x (Number of units you produce in B) 
------------------------------------------------ 
= Your Total Earnings in a period 
 
At the end of Stage B, you will again see a Results Screen showing similar 
information as the Results Screen described above. Additionally it will display your 
total earnings for that period and your accumulated earnings from all periods. After 
the Results Screen for Stage B, and before you enter the next period, your terminal 
will furthermore display a “History Screen” that shows the results from all previous 
periods in a summarised form.# 
 
Further Instructions 
Before you make a decision in *a period*#either Stage A or Stage B# you can 
experiment with different hypothetical choices by using the “Results Calculator”. You 
can activate the Results Calculator by clicking on a button on the “Decision Making 
Screen”. The Results Calculator is easy to use. You simply enter arbitrary numbers for 
your own production and for the production of the other firm[s]. When you press the 
Enter key, the Results Calculator will show you the resulting market price#s# and 
your profits for the hypothetical choices. 
#When you are in Stage A, the Results Calculator will allow you to enter hypothetical 
numbers for both stages. When you are in Stage B, the Results Calculator will only 
allow you to enter hypothetical numbers for Stage B, and it will take the results from 
the real Stage A as given when calculating Price B.# 
   24
Appendix B: The results calculator 
 
The results calculator works similar to the profit calculator used by Huck et al. in 
various experiments (e.g. Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 1999). A difference is that 
our calculator does not provide a button that computes the best response to other 
firms’ choices. The way the calculator could be used differed slightly between the 
Cournot and the AV treatment. The following describes the variant we programmed 
for the AV sessions; the Cournot calculator is a simplified version of this. 
In the forward stage of a period the results calculator worked as follows. First, 
the participant could enter a hypothetical own quantity and a hypothetical (total) 
quantity chosen by the other firm(s) in his or her market. After hitting the Enter key, 
the screen displayed the resulting forward market price and the hypothetical forward 
profit for the subject. Then a new window opened that allowed the subject to enter 
further hypothetical quantities for the second stage (spot market), where the spot 
price, spot profits and total profits were calculated according to the hypothetical 
choices of both the forward and the spot stage. 
In the spot market stage of a period subjects were only able to feed the results 
calculator with hypothetical spot quantities, and computations were then based on 
these hypothetical decisions and on the real forward quantities. 
 